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I. REGULATORY AND FACTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  PARTIES 
Jacques Bonhomme (Bonhomme), a foreign national and 
president and member of the board of directors of a mining 
company (Precious Minerals International or PMI), owns 
property in the State of Progress that contains the terminus of 
Ditch C-1 where it discharges through a culvert into Reedy 
Creek.  Bonhomme was a plaintiff in his action against Maleau 
and a defendant in the action brought by the State of Progress.  
On appeal he is an appellant and a cross-appellee. 
Shifty Maleau (Maleau), a mine operator, created piles of 
mining waste (overburden and slag) on his property that 
allegedly discharge waste, including arsenic, into Ditch C-1, 
which then flows through Bonhomme’s property where it 
discharges into Reedy Creek.  Maleau was a defendant in 
Bonhomme’s action against him and an intervenor-plaintiff in 
Progress’s action against Bonhomme.  He is an appellant and 
cross-appellee on appeal. 
The State of Progress (Progress) contains a portion of 
Reedy Creek and its terminus in Wildman Marsh, which is solely 
contained within Progress, and both Bonhomme and Maleau’s 
properties.  The rest of Reedy Creek is contained in the State of 
New Union.  Progress was a plaintiff in its action against 
Bonhomme and is an appellant and cross-appellee on appeal. 
1
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B.  APPLICABLE RULES OF LAW 
 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 Fed. R. Civ. P. (17)(a). 
 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA) § 101, 33 
U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). 
 CWA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012). 
 CWA § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012). 
 CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2013). 
C.  SUMMARY OF FACTS 
The undisputed facts established in the court below are as 
follows: 
Reedy Creek begins in the State of New Union and flows 50 
miles, eventually entering Progress and flowing into Wildman 
Marsh.  Reedy Creek is used as the water supply for Bounty 
Plaza, a service area in New Union on a federally-funded 
interstate highway and as irrigation in both states for 
agricultural products that are sold in interstate commerce.  Reedy 
Creek is not used and has never been used for waterborne 
transportation, and could not be so used with reasonable 
improvements.  Wildman Marsh, wholly located in Progress and 
mostly contained in Wildman National Wildlife Refuge, is an 
extensive wetlands and an essential stopover for migratory 
waterfowl.  Hunters from around the nation are drawn to the 
Marsh and add over $25 million to the local economy. 
Bonhomme, a foreign national and the President and a 
member of the board of directors and largest shareholder of 
Precious Metals International (PMI), owns property in Progress 
that fronts the Marsh.  He used the hunting lodge on the property 
up to eight times a year for hunting parties primarily consisting 
of business clients and associates of PMI; however, his use of the 
lodge has decreased in recent years to two times a year.  The 
parties dispute the cause of his decreased use – Bonhomme 
asserts that it is due to his fear of the arsenic in the Marsh, while 
Maleau and Progress assert it is due to PMI’s decline during the 
recent recession. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/2
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Ditch C-1 is a drainage ditch that contains running water 
except during annual periods of drought lasting from several 
weeks to three months.  One average, it is three feet wide and one 
foot deep.  The Ditch first flows through Maleau’s property in 
Jefferson County and then continues through several agricultural 
properties before it runs through Bonhomme’s property where it 
empties into Reedy Creek via a culvert. 
Maleau operates a gold mine in Lincoln County, Progress 
along the Buena Vista River, but trucks the overburden and slag 
to his property in Jefferson County, Progress.  Maleau places the 
piles of mining waste adjacent to Ditch C-1.  When it rains, the 
rainwater percolates through the piles, eroding channels from the 
piles leading to Ditch C-1.  These gravity-eroded channels carry 
arsenic and rainwater from the piles into Ditch C-1, which in turn 
carries the arsenic to Reedy Creek. 
Upstream of Maleau’s property, arsenic is undetectable in 
Ditch C-1; however, downstream of his property, arsenic is 
present in high levels.  Additionally, in Reedy Creek, arsenic is 
undetectable upstream of Ditch C-1, but is present downstream of 
Ditch C-1 and in Wildman Marsh.  Moreover, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service has detected arsenic in three Blue-winged Teal 
ducks in Wildman Marsh. 
Bonhomme sued Maleau under the citizen suit provision of 
the CWA for Maleau’s arsenic discharges into Ditch C-1 and 
Reedy Creek in violation of § 301(a).  After proper notice, 
Progress filed a citizen suit against Bonhomme alleging that he 
was in violation of CWA § 301(a) by discharging arsenic from his 
culvert into Reedy Creek. Maleau intervened in Progress’s action 
against Bonhomme as a matter of right under § 505(b)(1)(B). The 
cases were consolidated because the facts and law are the same.  
The defendant in each suit filed motions to dismiss. 
On July 23, 2012, the district court granted Progress’s and 
Maleau’s motion to dismiss and denied Bonhomme’s motion to 
dismiss, holding that (1) Bonhomme is not a real party in interest 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 17(a); (2) 
Bonhomme is not a citizen as defined in CWA §§ 505(g) and 
502(5); (3) Maleau’s waste piles are not point sources; (4) Ditch C-
1 is not a jurisdictional water of the United States; (5) Reedy 
Creek is a jurisdictional water of the United States; and (6) 
3
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Bonhomme violates the CWA by adding arsenic to Reedy Creek 
through a culvert on his property regardless of whether Maleau is 
the but-for cause of the presence of arsenic in Ditch C-1. 
II. ISSUES 
The parties have been ordered to brief the following issues on 
appeal: 
 Whether Bonhomme is the real party in interest 
under FRCP 17 to bring a suit against Maleau for 
violating § 301(a) of the CWA. 
o Maleau and Progress argue that PMI, not 
Bonhomme, is the real party in interest. 
o Bonhomme argues that he is the real party in 
interest. 
 Whether Bonhomme—a foreign national—is a 
“citizen” under CWA § 505 who may bring suit 
against Maleau. 
o On appeal, Maleau and Progress argue that 
Bonhomme is not a “citizen” under CWA § 505 and 
thus may not bring suit against Maleau. 
o Bonhomme argues that he is a “citizen” under CWA 
§ 505 and thus may bring a suit against Maleau. 
 Whether Maleau’s mining waste piles are “point 
sources” under CWA § 502(12) & (14). 
o On appeal, Maleau and Progress argue that 
Maleau’s mining waste piles are not point sources. 
o Bonhomme argues that Maleau’s waste piles are 
point sources. 
 Whether Ditch C-1 is a water of the United States 
under CWA § 502(7) & (12). 
o On appeal, Bonhomme and Progress argue that 
Ditch C-1 is a water of the United States. 
o Maleau argues that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the 
United States. 
 Whether Reedy Creek is a water of the United 
States under CWA § 502(7) & (12). 
o On appeal, Bonhomme and Progress argue that 
Reedy Creek is a water of the United States. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/2
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o Maleau argues that Reedy Creek is not a water of 
the United States. 
 Whether Bonhomme violates CWA § 301(a) by 
adding arsenic to Reedy Creek through a culvert on 
his property even if Maleau is the but-for cause of 
the presence of arsenic in Ditch C-1. 
o On appeal, Maleau and Progress argue that 
Bonhomme is in violation of CWA § 301(a) because 
Bonhomme is the owner of the culvert discharging 
into Reedy Creek. 
o Bonhomme argues that Maleau is in violation of 
CWA § 301(a) because Maleau is the but-for cause 
of the presence of arsenic in Ditch C-1. 
[See pages 22-23 for tables showing the parties’ procedural 
postures and general arguments by issue.] 
III. FRCP 17(A)—DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN 
HOLDING THAT BONHOMME WAS NOT THE 
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BRING SUIT 
AGAINST MALEAU FOR VIOLATING § 301 OF 
THE CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311? 
Bonhomme argues that he is the real party in interest 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 17(a) and that the 
court below erred in granting Progress’ and Maleau’s motion to 
dismiss on this issue.  Maleau and Progress argue that 
Precious Metals International (PMI) is the real party in interest 
under FRCP 17(a) and that the court below did not err in 
granting their motion to dismiss on this issue. 
Under FRCP 17(a), “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (17)(a). The 
purpose of this requirement is to direct the court’s “attention to 
whether the plaintiff has a significant interest in the particular 
action he has instituted.”  6 CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1542 (3d 
ed. 1998).  The plaintiff has a significant interest in an action 
when he holds a substantive right to be enforced. See Farrell 
Const. Co. v. Jefferson Parish, La., 896 F.2d 136, 140 (5th Cir. 
1990).  To determine Bonhomme’s substantive rights, the parties 
5
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must look to CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, which states that “any 
person or persons having an interest which is or may be affected” 
may bring an action on his behalf. See 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra, § 1544, at 639 (stating that where federal statutes create a 
substantive right of action, the issue of whether the plaintiff is a 
real party in interest must be resolved by looking to federal law). 
Bonhomme will argue that although he is associated with 
PMI, he is still the real party in interest in this action as he has 
“an interest which . . . is affected.”  Bonhomme should recognize 
that his property has ties with PMI, but he should emphasize the 
economic ramifications on his ownership and use of his property 
in addition to his environmental interest in using the Marsh to 
hunt. See 118 CONG. REC. 33,699-700 (1972) (remarks of Sen. 
Edmund Muskie) (Congress intended that a proper interest under 
CWA § 505 can be economic, aesthetic, or environmental). 
Bonhomme owns a hunting lodge that fronts Wildman 
Marsh, which he contends has been negatively affected by the 
discharge of arsenic.  While Bonhomme does not reside at the 
hunting lodge, he is the owner of the property and had used the 
lodge up to eight times a year when the Marsh was not 
contaminated with arsenic.  Bonhomme further alleges that the 
wildlife, including ducks, are being harmed by the arsenic, and 
thus he has decreased the use of his hunting lodge to only twice a 
year.  Bonhomme will maintain that because the arsenic has 
negatively affected his use of his property and Wildman Marsh, 
he is a “person[] having an interest which is . . . affected,” and 
thus holds a substantive right to be enforced under the CWA as 
the real party in interest. 
Moreover, Bonhomme may argue that he is the real party in 
interest regardless of whether PMI may benefit from the 
prosecution of this action. Reichhold Chemical Inc. v. Travelers 
Insurance Co. held that the plaintiff need not be the ultimate 
economic beneficiary of the action in order to be the real party in 
interest.  Bonhomme can thus argue that he is the real party in 
interest even if PMI may ultimately reap economic benefits from 
the action. 544 F. Supp. 645, 649 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
Conversely, Maleau and Progress will argue that PMI is 
the real party in interest in this action.  Bonhomme is the 
president and a 3% shareholder of PMI in addition to being on its 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/2
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board of directors.  Bonhomme’s hunting lodge is used sparingly 
and primarily for hunting parties comprised of business 
associates of PMI.  Moreover, Maleau alleges that any decrease in 
use of the lodge is more likely to be a reflection of the economic 
health of PMI than the effect of any alleged arsenic discharges. 
Maleau and Progress can also argue that Bonhomme has 
nothing to gain or lose from the prosecution of the action and thus 
is not a real party in interest. Buhonick v. Am. Fidelity & Cas. 
Co., 190 F. Supp. 399, 402 (W.D. Penn. 1960).  Since PMI is 
paying attorney fees and court costs, Bonhomme will not suffer 
negative economic consequences should he lose nor will he be 
entitled to attorney’s fees under CWA § 505(d) should he win.  
However, Bonhomme may respond that he stands to gain or lose 
noneconomic interests in the improvement or continued pollution 
of the Marsh. 
While Maleau and Progress will argue that the fact that PMI 
is paying for attorney’s fees, witness fees, and paid for water 
testing demonstrates that PMI is the real party in interest, 
Bonhomme will respond that these facts are irrelevant to the 
real party in interest analysis. See Rackley v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Orangeburg Reg’l Hosp., 35 F.R.D. 516, 518 (E.D.S.C. 1964) 
(holding that inquiries concerning who was paying for plaintiffs’ 
attorney’s fees were irrelevant to FRCP 17(a) analysis). 
A.  STANDING 
Although the concepts of Article III standing and the 
plaintiff’s status as a real party in interest are distinct 
considerations, the inquiries may still be intertwined.  Some 
courts have recognized the interconnected relationship between 
the two concepts and have held that once a plaintiff has been 
found to have standing, any further litigation of his status as a 
real party in interest is foreclosed. Apter v. Richardson, 510 F.2d 
351, 353 (7th Cir. 1975).  In this case, the issue of standing was 
not litigated before the lower court; however, standing may be 
raised at any point in the litigation. Nat’l Org. for Women v. 
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994).  Bonhomme could therefore 
argue that he meets the standing requirements to bring a suit 
under the CWA, and therefore he must also be the real party in 
interest. 
7
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Generally, in order for a plaintiff to have Article III standing, 
he must show that (1) he has suffered a “concrete and particular” 
injury which is “actual or imminent;” (2) “the injury is fairly . . . 
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;” and (3) it is 
likely “that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  
Bonhomme can argue that he has suffered an injury by citing to 
his fear of using and his decreased use of the Marsh for duck 
hunting.  See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (“[E]nvironmental 
plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that 
they use the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic 
and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the 
challenged activity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Since 
Bonhomme has used the Marsh in the past and will not continue 
to use it to the same extent due to its pollution, he has alleged an 
injury in fact.  Additionally, the water tests suggest that the 
arsenic in the Creek and the Marsh originate from Maleau’s 
waste piles, demonstrating that the injury is fairly traceable to 
Maleau’s alleged discharges and that Maleau’s cessation of 
discharging would redress his injury. 
Alternatively, Maleau and Progress will argue that it is 
not settled law that a plaintiff’s Article III standing automatically 
gives him status as the real party in interest. Gonzalez ex rel. 
Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing 4 
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ¶ 17.1 
0[1] (3d ed. 1997)).  Maleau and Progress may go on to argue that 
Bonhomme does not have Article III standing, however this 
argument is weak.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. If a party makes an argument against Bonhomme’s Article III standing, 
make sure that they are attacking an element of the Article III standing based 
on evidence in the record and not speculation. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/2
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IV. CWA § 505—DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN 
DETERMINING THAT BONHOMME, A 
FOREIGN NATIONAL, IS NOT A “CITIZEN” 
UNDER CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, AND THUS 
CANNOT MAINTAIN A SUIT AGAINST 
MALEAU? 
Bonhomme argues that despite being a foreign national, he 
is nonetheless a “citizen” as defined in CWA §§ 505(g) and 502(5), 
33 U.S.C. §§1365(g) and 1362(5).  Maleau and Progress argue 
that as a foreign national, Bonhomme cannot be a “citizen” as 
defined by CWA §§ 505(g) and 502(5). 
CWA § 505(a) provides that “any citizen may commence a 
civil action on his own behalf . . . against any person . . . who is 
alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation . . . 
.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g).  Citizen is then further defined in CWA § 
502(5) for the purposes of § 505 as “a person . . . having an 
interest which is or may be adversely affected.” 33 U.S.C. § 
1365(g).  Person is then defined as “an individual, corporation, 
partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or 
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(5).  There is virtually no case law to support either 
Bonhomme’s or Maleau and Progress’s positions. Thus, the 
parties’ arguments will be based on (perhaps creative) statutory 
interpretation. 
Bonhomme’s strongest argument is that although the word 
citizen is used in CWA § 505(a), Congress was silent as to the 
requirement of United States citizenship.  Further, Congress’s 
silence on the matter does not create a “clear and manifest 
purpose” to exempt foreign nationals from commencing a citizen 
suit under CWA § 505. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & 
Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 432 (2002) (stating that Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act’s (FIFRA’s) silence as 
to whether local governments could regulate the sale of pesticides 
“cannot suffice to establish a clear and manifest purpose to pre-
empt local authority . . .” under that statute.).  Congress had the 
opportunity to include a U.S. citizenship requirement in the 
definition of citizen in CWA § 505(g), but did not do so.  
Bonhomme will argue that this silence on the matter cannot 
9
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disqualify a foreign national from bringing suit under the CWA’s 
citizen suit provision. 
Moreover, Bonhomme may assert that reading “citizen” so 
as to require United States citizenship frustrates the purpose of 
CWA § 505.  Section 505 was intended to allow the public to 
supplement administrative response to water pollution. See Com. 
of Mass. v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976); S. 
REP. NO. 92-414, 3745-46  (1972).  The additional requirement of 
United States citizenship would further restrict public 
participation and negatively affect the efficacy of the citizen suit 
provision. 
Alternatively, Progress’ and Maleau’s strongest argument 
is for a plain reading of the word citizen.  The Supreme Court has 
stated “the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be 
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is 
plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according 
to its terms.” Cent. Trust Co. v. Official Creditor’s Comm. of 
Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1982) (citing Caminetti 
v. United States., 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).  The common 
meaning of citizen is “[a] person who legally belongs to a country 
and has the rights and protection of that country.” Citizen, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/citizen (last visited Dec. 2, 2013); see also 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 278 (9th ed. 2009) (defining citizen as 
“[a] person who, by either birth or naturalization, is a member of 
a political community, owing allegiance to the community and 
being entitled to enjoy all its civil rights and protections; a 
member of the civil state, entitled to all its privileges.”).  Thus, 
they will argue that the plain meaning of CWA § 505(a) prohibits 
the commencement of a suit by a foreign national such as 
Bonhomme. 
However, Bonhomme may argue that the Supreme Court 
has already rejected the argument that the plain meaning of 
“citizen” prohibits the commencement of a citizen suit by a person 
or entity that is not a citizen as defined in the dictionary.  In 
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, the Supreme Court 
held that the State of Ohio was a “citizen” under CWA § 505(a) 
and was thus entitled to maintain its suit against the 
Department of Energy. 503 U.S. 607, 616 (1992).  Moreover, 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/2
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courts have consistently allowed nonprofit corporations to bring 
citizen suits without questioning their status as a “citizen” under 
the CWA. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167; Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.  Both 
states and corporations are not citizens under the plain meaning 
of the word, but have nevertheless been allowed to maintain 
citizen suits as “citizens” under the CWA.  Thus, Bonhomme may 
argue that such a stringent reading of the statute is 
unwarranted. 
Maleau and Progress will argue that the use of “person” in 
§ 502(5) of the CWA to define citizen does not deprive the word 
“citizen” of all meaning.  In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court held 
that Congress’s use of “waters of the United States” in defining 
the narrower concept of “navigable waters” did not deprive the 
word navigable of all meaning. 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001).  
Similarly, Congress’s use of the broader term “person” in defining 
“citizen” cannot deprive the word citizen of all meaning.  
Therefore, Bonhomme must be a citizen in addition to a person in 
order to bring a suit under the CWA. 
Further, Maleau and Progress will argue that such a plain 
reading of the CWA does not frustrate the purpose of the CWA or 
create an absurd result.  There is no indication that Congress, by 
using the word “citizen,” had any other intent than to make 
United States citizenship a prerequisite to the commencement of 
a citizen suit. 
V.  POINT SOURCES—DID THE LOWER COURT 
ERR IN HOLDING THAT MALEAU’S MINING 
WASTE PILES ARE NOT POINT SOURCES? 
Bonhomme contends that Maleau’s mining waste piles are 
point sources under CWA §§ 502(12) & (14), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(12) 
& (14).  However, Maleau and Progress respond that Maleau’s 
mining waste piles are not point sources under CWA §§ 502(12) & 
(14). 
Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits the “discharge of any 
pollutant by any person” except in compliance with CWA permits. 
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  Under CWA § 502(12), the discharge of a 
pollutant is defined as the addition of a pollutant from a point 
source to a navigable water. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).  Furthermore, 
11
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CWA § 502(14) defines a point source as “any discernible, 
confined, and discrete conveyance.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).  
Conversely, the CWA does not prohibit the addition of a pollutant 
from nonpoint sources.  Therefore, whether Maleau’s waste piles 
are point sources is crucial to the question of whether Maleau has 
violated the CWA. 
Although § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), lists potential point 
sources as “any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, [or] 
discrete fissure . . . [,]” courts generally define the term broadly 
while still “exclud[ing] unchanneled and uncollected surface 
waters.” Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 
(4th Cir. 1976).  Courts in the Second and Fourth Circuits have 
already addressed the issue of whether mining waste is a point 
source and these cases provide arguments for the parties to 
present. 
Bonhomme’s strongest argument in asserting that Maleau’s 
mining waste piles are a point source is based on the court’s 
holding in Sierra Club v. Abston Cons. Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 
1980).  In Abston, the defendant coal mining company, while 
engaging in strip mining, created highly erodible piles of 
overburden and built sediment basins to catch any discharges 
from the piles.  However, during periods of heavy rain, pollutants 
were discharged into the creek from both overflow from the 
sediment basin and erosion-created ditches and gullies leading to 
the stream from the spoil piles. 
In addressing whether the spoil piles fell under the definition 
of point source, the Fifth Circuit noted that the “ultimate 
question is whether pollutants were discharged from discernible, 
confined, and discrete conveyance(s)” and considered two 
situations in which mining spoil piles could be considered a point 
source. Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In the first 
situation, the court opined that a spoil pile may be a point source 
where “[g]ravity flow, result[s] in a discharge into a navigable 
body of water . . . if the miner at least initially collected or 
channeled the water and other materials.” Id.  In the second 
situation, the court stated that a spoil pile may be a point source 
“where miners design spoil piles from discarded overburden such 
that, during periods of precipitation, erosion of spoil pile walls 
results in discharges into a navigable body of water by means of 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/2
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ditches, gullies and similar conveyances, even if the miners have 
done nothing beyond the mere collection of rock and other 
materials.” Id. 
Bonhomme will argue that Maleau’s waste piles clearly fall 
under the second situation described in Abston and are thus 
included in the definition of point source.  Here, much like in 
Abston, Maleau has created highly erodible piles of mining 
overburden in close to proximity to a waterway.  These piles have 
predictably eroded and created a series of ditches and gullies 
leading to Ditch C-1 where they discharge arsenic.  Thus, under 
Abston, it is enough that Maleau has “done nothing beyond the 
mere collection of rock and other minerals.” Id.  It is irrelevant 
that the ditches and gullies have been created by gravity and 
erosion and not by human intervention; these waste piles are a 
point source since they are discharging pollutants through 
“discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance(s).” Id. 
Maleau and Progress will argue that his waste piles are 
not point sources because they do not fall under either of the 
scenarios described in Abston.  First, they can argue that 
although he has collected the waste materials, he has not 
“initially collected the water” discharged from his waste piles. Id.  
Thus, his waste piles do not fall under the first Abston scenario.  
As for the second Abston scenario, they can argue that although 
his spoil piles have eroded, creating ditches and gullies, they are 
not discharging into a navigable water.  In order for Maleau’s 
waste piles to fit into the second situation described by the court, 
the erosion from those piles would have to “discharge[] into a 
navigable body of water.” Id.  Since the court in Abston clearly 
included a requirement that the erosion discharge into a 
navigable water, Maleau’s waste piles are not point sources. Id.  
(The navigability of Ditch C-1 is discussed infra at 16.) 
However, Bonhomme may note that the non-navigability of 
Ditch C-1 does not necessarily foreclose the Court finding that the 
waste piles are point sources.  Courts have held that discharges 
into non-navigable conveyances leading to a navigable water are 
still classified as discharges from a point source. See Sierra Club 
v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that a mine shaft was a point source where 2.5 miles of 
tunnel separated shaft and navigable water); Concerned Area 
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Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(holding that a pipe discharging into a ditch which then 
discharged into a navigable water was a point source). 
Further, Maleau and Progress will argue that Abston 
should not be applied because it is not established law as to 
mining waste discharge, as the Fourth Circuit has also had the 
opportunity to address the issue of discharges from mining waste 
in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) 
and Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 
1979), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Envtl. Prot. Agency v. 
Nat’l Crushed Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980).  In Appalachian 
Power, the Fourth Circuit considered a challenge to EPA’s 
regulation of the runoff from areas used for material storage.  
While in Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit considered 
challenges to EPA’s regulation of coal preparation areas.  In both 
cases, the court held that unchanneled water from materials 
storage or coal preparation does not fall under the definition of 
point source. 
In Appalachian Power, the court remanded EPA’s rainfall 
runoff regulations because the regulations were not confined to 
point source pollution. 545 F.2d at 1372.  In coming to this 
conclusion, the court decided that the regulations, as written, 
could apply to runoff that was neither channelized or collected 
and held that “[the definition of point source] does not include 
unchanneled and uncollected surface waters.” Id.  Additionally, 
the court recognized that runoff from storage areas was not 
typically routed through a point source collection system, 
indicating that those areas could not be point sources without a 
collection system. Id. 
In Consolidation Coal, the court upheld EPA’s regulations 
regarding surface runoff at coal preparation plants.  The relevant 
portion of the challenged regulation applied to “discharges from 
coal preparation plants and associated areas, including 
discharges which are pumped, siphoned or drained from coal 
storage.” 604 F.2d at 249.  In upholding the regulations, the court 
again noted that “unchanneled and uncollected surface waters” 
are not included in the definition of point source and found that 
the regulation excluded those nonpoint sources. Id. 
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Maleau and Progress will argue that together Appalachian 
Power and Consolidation Coal stand for the proposition that 
waste piles are not point sources unless their runoff is channeled 
and collected.  They will argue that here, although there has been 
erosion, there has been no channelization or collection by Maleau 
of the runoff from the piles in any collection system.  Thus under 
the Fourth Circuit’s decisions, Maleau’s piles are not point 
sources and the discharge is merely “unchanneled and 
uncollected surface water[].”604 F.2d at 249. 
Bonhomme will argue that although Appalachian Power 
and Consolidation Coal may stand for the proposition that waste 
piles are not point sources unless their runoff is channeled and 
collected, the cases did not address the issue of channelization by 
erosion and gravity and can still be read in conjunction with 
Abston.  This argument is supported by the fact that the Abston 
court used both Appalachian Power and Consolidation Coal in 
support of its decision. 620 F.2d at 45.  Moreover, mining 
discharges caused by rain fall, but traceable to a discrete source, 
have been found to be point sources. See Trs. for Alaska v. Envt’l 
Prot. Agency, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984) (“When mining 
activities release pollutants from a discernable conveyance, they 
are subject to NPDES regulation, as are all point sources.”); 
Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 
988 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (reasoning that because discharges from 
mining ponds and refuse piles are easily traceable to their source, 
they are discharges from point sources even if the discharge was 
caused by rain fall). 
Bonhomme may also argue that Appalachian Power and 
Consolidation Coal do not apply because they predate EPA’s 
NPDES Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water 
Discharges Rule, which requires a NPDES to discharge 
contaminated storm water from a mining operation. 55 Fed. Reg. 
47990, 48029 (Nov. 16, 1990) (not requiring NPDES permits for 
discharges of storm water “that are not contaminated by contact 
with any overburden, raw material, intermediate products, 
finished product, by product or waste products . . . .”).  Since the 
discharges from Maleau’s piles are contaminated with overburden 
and waste products, Maleau must obtain a NPDES permit for the 
15
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discharges.  Given that NPDES permits regulate point sources, 
Bonhomme can argue that Maleau’s waste piles are point sources. 
VI.  NAVIGABILITY—DID THE LOWER COURT 
ERR IN DETERMINING THAT REEDY CREEK 
IS A NAVIGABLE WATER/WATER OF THE 
UNITED STATES? 
The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable 
waters, defined as “waters of the United States, including 
territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) & 1362(7).  Therefore, the 
navigability of both Ditch C-1 (discussed infra at 16) and Reedy 
Creek are necessary elements in determining whether either 
Maleau or Bonhomme is violating the CWA.  Bonhomme and 
Progress contend that Reedy Creek is a water of the United 
States (or water of the U.S.).  Maleau asserts that Reedy Creek 
is not a water of the U.S. 
In the context of the CWA, the Supreme Court has noted that 
actual navigability, like that discussed in The Daniel Ball, 10 
Wall. 557, 563 (1871) (holding that a river is navigable if it is 
navigable in-fact, meaning that it is used or is susceptible of use 
as a highway of commerce), is of “limited import.” United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).  On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the word 
navigable cannot be devoid of all meaning in determining 
whether waters are jurisdictional waters of the U.S. under the 
CWA. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs., 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (commonly referred to as 
SWANCC). 
Bonhomme and Progress’s first and most obvious 
argument is that Reedy Creek is a water of the U.S. because it is 
an interstate water.  EPA’s definition of waters of the U.S. 
includes “[a]ll interstate waters.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.  Since Reedy 
Creek begins in the State of New Union and ends in the State of 
Progress, it is clearly an interstate water and thus falls under the 
definition of waters of the U.S.  The Fourth Circuit indicated that 
the interstate nature of a water may be enough for classification 
as a water of the U.S. when it stated that “the phrase navigable 
waters refers to waters which, if not navigable in fact, are at least 
interstate.” United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 
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1997).  Additionally, Bonhomme and Progress can bolster their 
argument that Reedy Creek is a water of the U.S. due to its 
interstate nature by citing the Supreme Court’s emphasis of the 
intrastate nature of the ponds in SWANCC, which the Court held 
were not waters of the U.S.; the parties might argue that the 
SWANCC opinion indicates that the ponds may have been waters 
of the U.S. if they were interstate.  SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72. 
Maleau, however, may raise the point that the interstate 
nature of Reedy Creek alone may not necessarily make it a water 
of the U.S.  He can argue that since Congress’s authority to 
regulate waters of the U.S. rests on the Commerce Clause, the 
fact that it is interstate is not sufficient for Congress’s regulation 
under the Commerce Clause. See ONRC Action v. U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, No. 97–3090–CL, 2012 WL 3526833 at *12 (D. 
Idaho 2012) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 44 U.S. 164, 
174 (1979)). 
In ONRC, the court held that the Klamath Straits Drain was 
a water of the U.S. as it was interstate and substantially affected 
interstate commerce.  The court considered the drain as part of a 
much larger watershed, including a river and a lake, which 
helped provide irrigation for $120 million dollars’ worth of 
agricultural products and hydroelectric power for parts of 
California and Oregon.  In comparison, Reedy Creek’s only uses 
are as a water supply for a singular rest stop and irrigation for 
agriculture along its 50-mile stretch.  Maleau can argue that 
because the interstate effects of Reedy Creek are significantly 
smaller than that of the drain in ONRC, it is not clear that the 
Creek has “an indisputable direct and significant impact on 
interstate commerce.” Id.  Thus, the Creek is not a water of the 
U.S. 
In response, Bonhomme and Progress may argue that 
even if the interstate nature of the Creek is alone is not enough 
for it to be classified as a water of the U.S., the Creek’s effects on 
interstate commerce are similar to that of the Drain in ONRC.  
Although the Creek’s agricultural use may be more limited than 
that in ONRC, it is still used primarily for the irrigation of 
17
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agricultural products sold in interstate commerce.2  Additionally, 
the Creek affects Wildman Marsh, which draws hunters from 
other states, adding $25 million to the local economy.  Thus, 
Bonhomme and Progress may contend that the Creek is a water 
of the U.S. since it is interstate in nature and adequately affects 
interstate commerce. 
Maleau may point to SWANCC to support the proposition 
that Reedy Creek’s use for irrigation does not make it a water of 
the U.S.  In SWANCC, the Supreme Court held that the 
“Migratory Bird Rule,” which contained a provision including 
intrastate waters used to irrigate crops sold in interstate 
commerce in the definition of waters of the U.S., exceeded 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. 531 U.S. at 174.  
However, Bonhomme and Progress will point out that the 
regulations in SWANCC were applicable to intrastate waters, so 
it is unclear if they would be found to exceed the Commerce 
Clause powers if applied to an interstate water such as Reedy 
Creek. 
Additionally, Bonhomme and Progress may argue that 
Reedy Creek is a navigable water by relying upon United States 
v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).  In Earth 
Sciences, the Fourth Circuit held that a creek that supported 
wildlife and provided water for irrigation for agriculture sold in 
interstate commerce was a water of the U.S. because it affected 
interstate commerce. Id. at 374.  However, Maleau may call 
Earth Science’s validity into doubt by pointing out that it 
predates both Rapanos and SWANCC. 
Bonhomme and Progress can argue that Reedy Creek still 
falls within the definition of waters of the U.S. regardless of 
whether it is an interstate water since it is a tributary of 
Wildman Marsh, which is mostly contained within Wildman 
National Wildlife Refuge.  Although EPA does not include 
intrastate wetlands that are on Federal lands in their definition 
 
 2. An interesting (and creative) argument for Bonhomme to make is that 
Reedy Creek’s use for irrigation makes the water in the creek a commodity of 
interstate commerce, making federal jurisdiction under the CWA and the 
Commerce Clause proper. Cf. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 
(1978) (holding that garbage, as an object of interstate trade, invoked the 
dormant commerce clause). 
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of waters of the U.S., 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, Bonhomme and Progress 
can argue that the Marsh is a water of the U.S. as it falls within 
the plain meaning of the phrase in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) because 
Congress may regulate the waters on its lands through the 
Property Clause. U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 3, cl. 2.  Thus, since the 
definition of waters of the U.S. include tributaries to those waters 
and Reedy Creek is a tributary of Wildman Marsh, Reedy Creek 
falls within that definition. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.  Maleau, on the 
other hand, can point out that EPA’s definition of waters of the 
U.S. includes no such interpretation that federal wetlands are 
included in waters of the U.S. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.  Moreover, a 
tributary is only considered a water of the U.S. if it is a tributary 
to a water described in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.  Thus, Reedy Creek, as 
a tributary, does not fall under EPA’s definition of waters of the 
U.S. 
VII. NAVIGABILITY—DID THE LOWER COURT 
ERR IN HOLDING THAT DITCH C-1 IS NOT A 
NAVIGABLE WATER/WATER OF THE UNITED 
STATES? 
Bonhomme and Progress argue that Ditch C-1 is a water 
of the United States (or water of the U.S.), while Maleau 
contends that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the U.S.  The main issue 
in determining whether Ditch C-1 is a water of the U.S. is 
whether the term water of the U.S. includes intermittent 
channels that are tributaries to a water of the U.S.  While 
Rapanos ultimately dealt with the classification of wetlands 
adjacent to navigable waters and tributaries, the Supreme Court 
also discussed the issue of intermittently dry tributaries in that 
case. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  The 
fragmented opinion created two tests for determining if a water is 
a water of the U.S., the “relatively permanent waters” standard 
as espoused by the plurality and the “significant nexus” standard 
created by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  The question of which 
test is controlling leaves room for both sides to make arguments 
as to whether Ditch C-1’s is a water of the U.S.3 Rapanos, 547 
 
 3. Since Rapanos is a plurality opinion, there is debate as to the proper 
application of the two tests.  Some circuits have used only Justice Kennedy’s 
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U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the lack of a 
majority gives no precise limit on CWA’s jurisdiction). 
A. THE “SIGNIFICANT NEXUS” TEST  
Bonhomme and Progress may rely upon Justice Kennedy’s 
“significant nexus test” in arguing that Ditch C-1, as a tributary 
to a water of the U.S., is in turn a water of the U.S.  In his 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy called into doubt the plurality’s 
requirement that waters of the U.S. are necessarily permanent, 
reasoning that a requirement that would allow federal 
jurisdiction over a continuous trickle, but not a seasonal high 
volume stream “makes little practical sense in a statute 
concerned with downstream water quality.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 
769 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Moreover, Justice Kennedy stated 
that waters, whether or not they are intermittent, having a 
significant nexus with a water that is navigable in fact are waters 
of the U.S. Id. at 759.  A significant nexus exists between two 
bodies of water if there is evidence of a hydrological connection 
demonstrating the “significance of the connection for downstream 
water quality.” Id. at 784. 
Bonhomme and Progress may assert that Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion is controlling, citing the decisions of the 
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, and thus Ditch C-1 is a 
water of the U.S. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 
F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of 
Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Robinson, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007).  Accordingly, 
since Bonhomme and Progress may establish a relatively 
permanent hydrological connection and an effect on the water 
quality of the creek, they will argue that Ditch C-1 is a water of 
the U.S. 
 
“significant nexus” test, relying on Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) 
(holding where there is a fragmented Supreme Court decision, the concurrence 
on the narrowest ground may be considered to be the holding of the case).  
However, other circuits have interpreted Marks differently or have not applied 
Marks and found that a water is a jurisdictional water of the United States 
using either test. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 
2006) (holding that Justice Stevens’ dissent finding jurisdiction using either test 
to be “controlling”). 
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However, Maleau may call into question the applicability of 
the “significant nexus” test to the facts of this case.  First, Maleau 
will point out Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test – requiring 
that the water in question have a significant nexus with a 
navigable-in-fact water – is not clearly applicable to the facts of 
this case.  Here, Reedy Creek is not navigable in fact, as it has 
never been used as waterborne transportation and it could not be 
used so without modification, as noted by the lower court.  The 
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (“[Waters] are navigable in 
fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their 
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade 
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of 
trade and travel on water.”).  Still, Bonhomme and Progress 
may be able to argue that Ditch C-1 is a water of the U.S. 
regardless of whether Reedy Creek is navigable in fact. See Envtl. 
Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 823 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (holding that in order to find that streams are waters 
of the U.S., plaintiff needed to demonstrate a significant nexus 
between intermittent streams and creek which was a water of the 
U.S., without the court finding that the creek was navigable in 
fact.). 
Second, Maleau may argue that the “significant nexus” test 
only applies to wetlands and thus does not apply to Ditch C-1. See 
S.F. Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 481 F.3d 700, 707 (9th Cir. 
2007) (holding that a court cannot use the “significant nexus” test 
to evaluate the navigability of non-wetlands); see also Benjamin 
v. Douglas Ridge Rifle Club, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1215 (D. Or. 
2009).  However, Bonhomme and Progress will point out that 
other courts have also examined whether the “significant nexus” 
test applies to tributaries and have concluded that the test does 
apply. See Robinson, 505 F.3d at 1222-23; Pac. Lumber Co., 469 
F. Supp. at 823; United States v. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 
1171 (D. Idaho 2011). 
B. “RELATIVELY PERMANENT WATERS” TEST  
Whether or not the significant nexus test applies, 
Bonhomme and Progress may still argue that Ditch C-1 is a 
water of the U.S. even under the Rapanos plurality’s “relatively 
permanent waters” test.  Under this test, only waters that are 
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“relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of 
water” can be classified as waters of the U.S. Id. at 733.  The test 
thus excludes “channels through which water flows 
intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically 
provide drainage for rainfall.” Id. at 739.  However, Bonhomme 
and Progress will point out that the plurality noted that this test 
does not “necessarily exclude streams, rivers, or lakes that might 
dry up in extraordinary circumstances, such as drought.” Id. at 
732 n. 5.  Since Ditch C-1’s flow is more than intermittent since it 
contains flowing water for up to eleven months out of the year at 
the maximum and nine months at minimum. Vierstra, 803 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1168, aff’d 492 Fed. Appx. 738 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that a canal that only held water for six to eight months 
a year was a water of the U.S. since it met both the “relatively 
permanent” and “significant nexus” standards).  Additionally 
regardless of the period of flow, Ditch C-1 flows only with the 
exception of periods of drought.  Thus under the plurality’s 
“relatively permanent waters” test, the Ditch’s lack of water 
during drought does not preclude it from being a water of the U.S. 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732 n.5. 
Moreover, Bonhomme and Progress can argue that the 
Twelfth Circuit should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
Rapanos that a “seasonally intermittent stream which ultimately 
empties into a . . . water of the United States can, itself, be a 
water of the United States.” United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 
989 (9th Cir. 2007).  Under this interpretation, Ditch C-1 would 
clearly be included in the waters of the U.S.  Maleau, however, 
can distinguish Moses from the case at bar as the water in 
question here is not a natural stream but a manmade ditch 
created for drainage. 
Maleau will argue that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the U.S. 
under the “relatively permanent waters” test.  The plurality 
excluded “ditches, channels, and conduits” from its “relatively 
permanent waters” on the basis that they could not be at once 
both listed a point source and included in the definition of 
navigable waters. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737.  While Maleau 
should address the dissent’s and Justice Kennedy’s argument 
that excluding ditches from the definition of waters of the U.S. is 
a matter of semantics, ultimately he can contend that the 
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distinction stands.  He can argue that while there are times when 
a “ditch” can be a “stream,” this is not one of them.  When a ditch 
does not permanently hold water, like Ditch C-1, it should not be 
classified as a stream or as a water of the U.S. Id. at 736 n.7. 
Additionally, Maleau can argue that even if the “relatively 
permanent waters” test could include ditches that did not contain 
a permanent flow, the fact that Ditch C-1 dries up for up to three 
months every year makes the water flow intermittent.  However, 
Bonhomme and Progress should note that this argument is 
relatively weak.  Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide 
how many moths per year water must flow in order for the water 
to be “relatively permanent,” lower courts have generally found 
that anywhere from 3-6 months is an acceptable minimum. See 
Deerfield Plantation Phase II-B Prop. Owners Ass’n v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 501 Fed. Appx. 268, 271 (4th Cir. 2012) (3 
months); Vierstra, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (6-8 months). 
VIII.  VIOLATION—DID THE LOWER COURT ERR 
IN HOLDING THAT BONHOMME IS IN 
VIOLATION OF § 301(A) OF THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT? 
Section 301(a) of the CWA states that “the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful,” subject to enumerated 
exceptions. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).  Bonhomme argues that he does 
not violate the CWA because Maleau indirectly adds arsenic to 
the Ditch via his waste piles.  Maleau and Progress argue that 
Bonhomme is liable regardless of who added the arsenic because 
Bonhomme owns the culvert/point source discharging the 
pollutant into Reedy Creek. 
Bonhomme may argue that he does not violate the CWA 
because Ditch C-1 is a jurisdictional water of the U.S., and 
therefore the point source discharge to waters of the U.S. occurs 
on Maleau’s property.  (The navigability of the Ditch and the 
Creek is discussed supra at 16 and 14 respectively.)  Under CWA 
§ 502(12), a discharge occurs only when a pollutant is added to 
waters of the U.S. from a point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).  EPA 
interprets the term addition to mean the physical addition of a 
pollutant to the water from the outside world and this 
interpretation has been upheld in various circumstances. See 
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Nat’l Wildlfe Found. v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that NPDES permitting 
should apply to dams because under EPA’s interpretation of 
“addition” dams do not add pollutants to water); Nat’l Wildlife 
Found. v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 862 F.2d 580, 584 
(6th Cir. 1988) (upholding EPA’s determination that turbines 
releasing water contaminated by entrained fish were not subject 
to NPDES permitting because the pollutants were already in the 
water); see also L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 710, 713 (2013) (holding that no addition 
occurs when water flows between two parts of the same water 
body) (citing S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95, 
109-12 (2004)).  Thus, Bonhomme will argue that Ditch C-1’s 
release of arsenic, which is already present in its water, into 
Reedy Creek cannot be an addition under EPA’s interpretation.  
Since Maleau has already added the arsenic to Ditch C-1, 
Bonhomme is not discharging a pollutant and cannot be in 
violation of CWA § 301.  However, Maleau and Progress will 
respond that Ditch C-1 is not a jurisdictional water of the U.S. 
and thus Bonhomme is liable for the discharge of arsenic into 
Reedy Creek since the discharge occurs on Bonhomme’s land. 
Bonhomme will reply that even if NPDES permitting 
applies to the discharge from Ditch C-1—meaning that Ditch C-1 
is not a water of the U.S.—into Reedy Creek, he is still not liable 
for the CWA violation as Maleau is the but-for cause of the 
addition of arsenic into the Creek.  In Rapanos, the plurality 
noted in dicta that “[t]he [CWA] does not forbid the ‘addition of 
any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’ 
but rather the ‘addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.’” 
547 U.S. at 743 (emphasis in original).  The plurality concluded 
that it is likely a violation of the CWA to discharge pollutants 
into a conveyance that would naturally wash downstream into a 
navigable water. Id. 
Moreover, lower courts have rejected the idea that a 
pollutant must be discharged directly into a navigable water for a 
violation of the CWA to occur.  In United States v. Velsicol 
Chemical Corporation, the defendant discharged pollutants into 
the city sewer system that ultimately discharged into the 
Mississippi River. 438 F. Supp. 945, 946-47 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).  
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The court found that although the defendant was not discharging 
directly into the Mississippi, “[t]he fact that defendant may 
discharge through conveyances owned by another party does not 
remove defendant’s actions from the scope of this Act.” Id. at 947.  
In Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., the court found that 
the defendant’s discharge of pollutants from mining waste piles 
into a mineshaft that then discharged into a navigable water 
violated the CWA. 421 F.3d 1133, 1141 (10th Cir. 2005).  Much 
like in Velsicol and El Paso Gold Mines, Maleau is discharging 
pollutants from his waste piles into a conveyance that flows into a 
water of the U.S.  Since Bonhomme can argue that a discharge of 
pollutants into a conveyance that naturally wash downstream is 
a violation of the CWA, he can argue that it is Maleau who is in 
violation by discharging pollutants into the Ditch that then 
naturally wash down stream into the Creek. 
Maleau and Progress have several ways of attacking the 
argument that Maleau is liable for a discharge that naturally 
washes downstream to water of the U.S. since he is the but-for 
cause of the discharge.  First, Maleau and Progress can discount 
both Rapanos’ and Velsicol’s application to this case.  The 
plurality in Rapanos did not decide the issue of discharges into a 
conveyance that wash downstream to a water of the United 
States, and thus the language relating to such discharges 
contained therein is dicta and is not binding precedent. 547 U.S. 
at 743.  Further, Maleau and Progress can argue that the 
discharge at issue here is distinguishable from that of Velsicol.  In 
Velsicol, the defendant was discharging not into a privately 
owned ditch but into a publicly owned treatment works. 438 F. 
Supp. at 946-47. 
Second, Maleau and Progress can make the argument that 
discharge and addition are not defined in terms of causation.  In 
West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, the 
Fourth Circuit stated that the CWA “bans the discharge of any 
pollutant by any person regardless of whether that person was 
the root cause or merely the current superintendent of the 
discharge.” 625 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 2010).  Although West 
Virginia Highlands involved the liability of the West Virginia 
Department of Environmental Protection for discharges from an 
inactive mine that it owned but had never operated or caused 
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discharges from the mine, the underlying reasoning that 
ownership, not causation, is the inquiry for determining liability 
still applies. 
El Paso Gold Mines also stands for the proposition that 
liability is predicated on ownership, not causation.  In that case 
the defendant was held liable for a violation of the CWA not only 
because he discharged pollutants into mineshaft that led to a 
water of the United States, but also because he owned the 
mineshaft. 421 F.3d at 1137 (“[T]he key to liability under the 
CWA is the ownership . . . of a point source which ‘adds’ 
pollutants to navigable waters, and liability therefore attaches 
not on the activity which results in the point source discharge, 
but rather on the point source discharge itself.”) (quoting Sierra 
Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Civ. No. 01-PC-2163 (OES), slip op. 
at 23-24 (D. Colo. Nov. 15, 2002)). 
Maleau and Progress can argue that these cases 
demonstrate that liability for a discharge is determined by 
ownership, not causation.  Here, Maleau’s waste piles discharge 
into the Ditch, but Bonhomme owns the culvert through which it 
discharges into Reedy Creek.  Maleau and Progress can argue 
that Maleau is not liable for the violation since liability under the 
CWA does not contemplate who causes the discharge, but simply 
who owns the point source.  Thus, Bonhomme, as owner of the 
conveyance, is liable for the violation of the CWA. 
However, Bonhomme may point out that in both West 
Virginia Highlands Conservancy and El Paso Goldmines, the 
owner of the point source was also the owner of the initial 
discharge.  Bonhomme may be able to distinguish these cases 
from the situation here since Maleau owns the property where 
the waste piles are discharging arsenic.  Thus, Bonhomme could 
argue that this case requires a different result. 
Maleau and Progress can further bolster the argument 
that Bonhomme is liable for the violation by virtue of his 
ownership of the Ditch by extending the logic from Miccosukee.  
In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court held that “[the] definition [of 
point source] includes within its reach point sources that do not 
themselves generate pollutants.” 541 U.S. at 105.  Maleau and 
Progress can argue that this again shows that the § 301(a) of the 
CWA is not interested in the cause of addition but rather with 
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where the discharge to a water of the United States occurs.  Since 
Bonhomme owns the culvert and since the culvert, although it 
does not generate a pollutant, is a point source, he is liable for the 
discharges under the CWA. 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the 
problem, merely an indicative list of issues to be discussed 
in teams’ written submissions and oral arguments.  One 
should appreciate reasoned and reasonable creativity and 
ideas beyond those in this limited analysis. 
[See pages 42-44 for issue tables and sample judges’ 
questions.] 
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Issue Table 1 
Summary of Parties’ Positions by Issue 
 District 
Court 
Progress Maleau Bonhomme 
Is 
Bonhomme 
the real 
party in 
interest 
under 
FRCP 17(a)? 
No. No. No. Yes. 
Is 
Bonhomme 
a “citizen” 
as defined 
by the 
CWA? 
No. No. No. Yes. 
Are 
Maleau’s 
waste piles 
are point 
sources? 
No. No. No. Yes. 
Is Ditch C-1 
a water of 
the United 
States?  
No. Yes. No. Yes. 
Is Reedy 
Creek a 
water of the 
United 
States? 
Yes. Yes. No. Yes. 
Does 
Bonhomme 
violate the 
CWA as 
owner of 
the culvert? 
Yes. Yes. Yes. No. 
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Issue Table 2 
 
Summary of Parties’ Procedural Postures by Issue 
Bonhomme 
Complaint 
District 
Court 
Holding 
Progress 
Posture on 
Appeal 
Maleau 
Posture on 
Appeal 
Bonhomme 
Posture on 
Appeal 
Bonhomme 
is the real 
party in 
interest 
under 
FRCP 
17(a). 
No. 
Bonhomme 
is not the 
real party 
in interest. 
(Agrees) (Agrees) Appeals 
Bonhomme 
is a 
“citizen” 
as defined 
by the 
CWA. 
No. 
Bonhomme 
is not a 
“citizen.” 
(Agrees) (Agrees) Appeals 
Maleau’s 
waste piles 
are point 
sources. 
No. 
Maleau’s 
piles are 
not point 
sources. 
(Agrees) (Agrees) Appeals 
Ditch C-1 
is a water 
of the 
United 
States.  
No. Ditch 
C-1 is not a 
water of 
the United 
States. 
Appeals (Agrees) Appeals 
Reedy 
Creek is a 
water of 
the United 
States. 
Yes. Reedy 
Creek is a 
water of 
the United 
States. 
(Agrees) Appeals (Agrees) 
Bonhomme 
violates 
the CWA 
as owner 
of the 
culvert. 
Yes. 
Bonhomme 
violates 
the CWA. 
(Agrees) (Agrees) Appeals 
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SAMPLE QUESTIONS 
These questions are developed as a starting point.  Please 
feel free to develop your own. 
Issue 1 (FRCP 17) Questions 
 Maleau and Progress 
o Why does Bonhomme’s association with PMI 
automatically mean that he is not the real party in 
interest? Why can’t two parties be real parties in 
interest? 
o Does Bonhomme really have nothing to gain or lose 
from this action?  Does the fact that Bonhomme 
may have a noneconomic stake in the ecological 
health of the Marsh change the answer to that 
question? 
 Bonhomme 
o If PMI also has an interest in this action, why 
shouldn’t PMI be the real party in interest under 
FRCP 17(a)? 
o Does it make sense that standing should grant a 
party status as the real party in interest? 
 Could there be a situation where a plaintiff 
has standing but is still not a real party in 
interest? 
Issue 2 (“Citizen” under CWA § 505) Questions 
 Maleau and Progress 
o Doesn’t the fact that “citizen” is further defined as 
a person or entity indicate that Congress did not 
intend for “citizen” to be narrowly read so as to 
actually require US citizenship to bring a CWA 
citizen suit? 
o If the purpose of the CWA citizen suit provision is 
to improve the enforcement of the CWA, wouldn’t 
requiring US citizenship frustrate that purpose? 
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 Bonhomme 
o Does it matter whether a state, municipality, or 
corporation is domestic and not foreign when suing 
under CWA § 505? 
o Wouldn’t allowing a foreign national to bring a suit 
under CWA § 505 as a “citizen” completely write 
out the word citizen from § 505? 
o Wouldn’t allowing foreign individuals or companies 
to sue under CWA § 505 be bad public policy since 
the US would be allowing foreign companies to sue 
and possibly damage US corporations? 
Issue 3 (Point Source) Questions 
 Maleau and Progress 
o How are Maleau’s waste piles in this case any 
different than those of the defendants in Abston? 
 If there is no factual difference then why 
shouldn’t this court adopt the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning that waste piles that cause water 
to create ditches and gullies running to a 
stream are point sources? 
o Even if a pile itself is not a “discernable, confined, 
and discrete conveyance,” aren’t the channels 
running from the piles “discernable, confined, and 
discrete conveyance[s]?” 
o Channels are included in the definition of point 
source.  Why shouldn’t the channels in this case be 
classified as a point source? 
o Even if Ditch C-1 is not navigable, aren’t Maleau’s 
waste piles still point sources? 
 Bonhomme 
o If this court finds that Ditch C-1 is not a water of 
the U.S. can Maleau’s waste piles still be point 
sources under the CWA? 
o Does Abston still apply to Maleau’s waste piles if 
this court finds that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the 
U.S.? 
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Issue 4 (Navigability—Reedy Creek) Questions 
 Maleau 
o 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 includes interstate waters in the 
definition of waters of the U.S. without 
qualification. Why should the requirement that an 
interstate water significantly affect interstate 
commerce be read into the definition? 
o Couldn’t the court view Reedy Creek’s water, which 
is used as irrigation for interstate agriculture, as a 
commodity and thus an instrumentality of 
commerce?  Would that then make Reedy Creek 
regulable under the CWA? 
 Bonhomme and Progress 
o How is Wildman Marsh, an intrastate wetland, a 
water of the U.S. under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2? 
 Does it even matter that most of the Marsh 
is on federal land under 40 C.F.R. § 122.2? 
o Does SWANCC rule out the argument that: 
 Wildman Marsh is a water of the U.S. due to 
its use by interstate duck hunters? or 
 Reedy Creek’s is a water of the U.S. due to 
its use as irrigation in interstate 
agriculture? 
Issue 5 (Navigability—Ditch C-1) Questions 
 Maleau 
o Although the plurality in Rapanos said that a point 
source cannot also be a navigable water, what is 
the real difference between a ditch that contains a 
relatively permanent flow of water and a stream? 
o Why shouldn’t this court adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning that a tributary to a seasonally 
intermittent stream is a water of the United 
States? 
o Does the fact that Ditch C-1 runs dry only up to 3 
months of the year actually make it an intermittent 
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stream under the plurality’s “relatively permanent 
waters” test? 
o Should both the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s 
tests apply? 
o What result does Marks mandate?  Does Marks 
even apply in this case? 
 Bonhomme and Progress 
o Can Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test 
apply to the facts of this case since Reedy Creek in 
not navigable in-fact? 
o Why should Ditch C-1 be a water of the United 
States when under Rapanos those conveyances 
listed as point sources cannot simultaneously be 
waters of the United States? 
o Should both the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s 
tests apply? 
 What result does Marks mandate?  Does 
Marks relevant here? 
 (Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) 
stands for the proposition that concurrence 
on the narrowest ground should be 
considered the holding of the case.) 
Issue 6 (Violation of CWA 301) Questions 
 Maleau and Progress 
o How do you respond to the plurality in Rapanos 
who concluded that it is likely that a person who 
discharges into a conveyance that then washes 
downstream to a water of the U.S. is in violation of 
the CWA? 
o Can the cases supporting the proposition that 
ownership of a point source is the ultimate 
determination of liability for a CWA violation be 
differentiated from the case at bar since Bonhomme 
only owns the culvert and not the original point of 
discharge? 
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 Bonhomme 
o Assuming that Ditch C-1 is not a water of the U.S., 
doesn’t Miccosukee suggest that Bonhomme is 
liable as the owner of a point source regardless of 
whether the point source he owns generated the 
pollutant? 
o Is Velsicol distinguishable from this case since the 
defendant in Velsicol was discharging into a 
publicly owned treatment works? 
 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol5/iss1/2
